id name autonomy country dataSource description developer development_date language processPhase programming_language project_url source_code_url state tags validation validation_method 1 Unnecessary items AUTONOMOUS INT procurement plan, awarded contracts, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if the list of contracts for goods, works, and services is not consistent with the project requirements OR specific line items in the bill of quantities are not required to carry out the work and may be used for personal purposes by officials or later serve as bribes. World Bank EN MULTIPLE_PHASES http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED quantity, theoretical, subject null 2 Non-compliance with the procurement plan AUTONOMOUS INT procurement plan, tender documents This redflag indicates risk where the use of sole sourcing or direct contracting contradicts the Procurement Plan calls for use of more competitive methods OR where there is sole sourcing or direct contracting for new procurement actions (not listed in the Procurement Plan) without obtaining the World Bank?s no objection. World Bank EN MULTIPLE_PHASES http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, direct contracting, procedural indicator, unjustified sole sourcing null 3 Multiple sole source awards AUTONOMOUS INT procurement plan, awarded contracts This redflag indicates risk if there are multiple sole source awards or direct contracting to the same company within the same procuring unit, where the items should have been procured separately (e.g., the additional activities are not a natural continuation of the existing contract) World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, direct contracting, procedural indicator, unjustified sole sourcing, statistics null 4 Unusual split of contract AUTONOMOUS INT procurment plan, tender documents This redflag indicates risk if there are two or more contracts issued for identical items over a short period of time for no apparent reason, which results in the application of a less competitive procurement method. It also indicates risk if the purchase of items that should have been procured jointly, but are procured by each sub-unit (eg one vehicle for on department). World Bank EN MULTIPLE_PHASES http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, contract splitting, procedural indicator null 5 Many awards just below treshold AUTONOMOUS INT procurement plan, awarded contracts This redflag indicates risk if there is an unreasonably large number of contracts awarded just below national competitive bidding treshold [NCB] OR there are related and simultaneous purchases from the same supplier in amounts just under the NCB threshold World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED quantity, theoretical, contract splitting, price, procedural indicator, statistics null 6 Inappropriate bundling AUTONOMOUS INT procurement plan, complaints This redflag indicates risk if there is a complaint from one or more bidders about the bundling of goods, works, and services AND/OR items to be procured within a proposed bundle are not related AND/OR there is a significant reduction in the number of potential or actual bidders AND/OR lack of justification for the bundling on the basis of cost savings or reduced risks World Bank EN MULTIPLE_PHASES http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, human scrutiny, subject, procedural indicator, inappropriate bundling null 7 Restricted circulation AUTONOMOUS INT published notices on local and national level This redflag indicates risk if there is no advertisement of the request for specific procurement notice [or expression of interest as required the WB procurement rules] OR only a limited circulation by posting the advertisement in a local rather than national gazette, when a national gazette would have resulted in more bids. World Bank EN PLANNING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, restricted information null 8 Short notice AUTONOMOUS INT published notices on local and national level This redflag indicates risk if the period between the advertisement and the bid submission deadline is very short. The Worldbank's Handbook does not imply actual timespan. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, temporal indicator, restricted information, statistics null 9 Inadequate information AUTONOMOUS INT published notice, bidding documents This redflag indicates risk if there are no complete contact information AND/OR the procuring entity drafts overly vague descriptions of the goods, works, or services (so that bidders cannot determine their interest) AND/OR drafts overly narrow descriptions of the goods, works, or services (so that exclude qualified bidders). World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, subject, restricted information, procedural indicator, rigged specifications null 10 Tailored specifications AUTONOMOUS INT published notice, bidding documents, complaints This redflag indicates risk if there is a close similarity between the specifications and the winning bidder?s product or services AND/OR specifications stipulate a brand name without stating ?or equivalent? AND/OR there are complaints from other bidders that the specifications match too closely those of a single competitor, or that a bidder prepared the contract specifications World Bank EN PLANNING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, subject, procedural indicator, bid, rigged specifications null 11 Few bids AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if only a few of the companies that purchase the bidding documents submit bids (especially if more than half drop out) AND/OR relatively few companies submit bids, compared to prior similar tenders AND/OR fewer than the normal or expected number of potential bidders apply for prequalification. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, output indicator, bid, rigged specifications null 12 Removal of a low priced item AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge, awarded contracts This redflag indicates risk if particular line items that are unreasonably low compared to market prices are later removed from the list of requirements under the contract. World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, subject, price, statistics null 13 Price disparity in bids AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if there is a wide and inexplicable disparity in bid prices considering the type of works, goods or services being procured. The Worldbank' Handbook does not indicate the scope of the width. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, price, unbalanced bidding, bid, statistics null 14 Poor response to reqest of clarification AUTONOMOUS INT bidding doments, complaints This redflag indicates risk if there are no adequate response or clarification by project officials to complaints from bidders about vague, ambiguous or incomplete specifications World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, restricted information, procedural indicator null 15 Signs of leaked confidential informations (objective) EL_OF_COMPOSITE INT bidding documents, procurement plan, published notices This redflag indicates risk if a bid closely tracks the project?s preferred solutions AND/OR the winning bid is just under the next lowest bid World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, leaking confidential information, bid null 16 Signs of leaked confidential informations (subjective) EL_OF_COMPOSITE INT tender documents, personal monitoring This redflag indicates risk if a questionable ?consultant? or ?middleman? is involved in the biddingAND/OR project officials and the favored bidder communicate (e.g., by email) or socialize during the bidding period World Bank EN MULTIPLE_PHASES http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, reputation, leaking confidential information null 17 Questionable evaluation of prequalifiation AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, evaluation documents This redflag indicates risk if there is unusual or unreasonable evaluation criteria for short-listing AND/OR One or more of the short-listed consultants or prequalified companies does not have the appropriate qualifications for the assignment AND/OR there is a wide gap in qualifications of the short-listed companies AND/OR Highly qualified firms have expressed interest and are not short-listed World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, eligibility criteria, process rigging, procedural indicator, biased evaluation null 18 Flawed pre-bid conference AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, tender documents This redflag indicates risk if the pre-bid conference is scheduled too close to the bid submission date or yields changes to specifications without changes in deadline AND/OR Questions raised during the pre-bid conference are not addressed properly AND/OR clarifitions and modifications are not shared with all the prospective bidders World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, restricted information, procedural indicator null 19 Failure to enforce bidding deadlines AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, tender documents This redflag indicates risk if the procuring entity fails to enforce bidding deadlines. The worldbank does not imply more accurate description to this redflag. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, temporal indicator, process rigging, leaking confidential information null 20 Taking breaks during the opening of bids AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, tender documents This redflag indicates risk if breaks take place during the opening of bids. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator null 21 Unreasonable pre- and post-qualification criteria AUTONOMOUS INT evaluation documents, published notices This redflag indicates risk if there is unreasonable pre- and post-qualification criteria (e.g., abnormally high annual turnover, liquidity reserves, or years of experience in the country) World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, eligibility criteria, exclusion of prequalified bidders null 22 De facto exclusion of pequalified bidders AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, complaints, personal monitoring This redflag indicates risk if qualified contractors fail to bid indicating that the bidding process may be rigged AND/OR Companies complain that officials refuse to make bidding documents available to potential bidders or accept the submisisons AND/ OR complaints from potential bidders that they are coerced to refrain from bidding through subtle suggestions, firm statements, intimidation, or physical threats World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED exclusion of bidders, theoretical, procedural indicator null 23 Acceptance of late bids AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, personal monitoring This redflag indicates risk if not all bids are brought to the opening ceremony AND/OR One or more of the submitted bids lack a time stamp World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED exclusion of bidders, theoretical, temporal indicator, analogue indicator null 24 Tampering with bids AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, personal monitoring This redflag indicates risk if a bid is not in a sealed envelope AND/OR Bids are not kept in a secure location with limited access World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED exclusion of bidders, theoretical, partially analogue indicator, bid null 25 Anomalies around bids AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, complaints, personal monitoring This redflag indicates risk if a bid's due date has been extended after some of the bids have been submitted AND/OR Some or all bids are disqualified for simple errors AND/OR Complaints from bidders that they were not allowed to submit bids AND/OR A bid is ?forgotten? in the safe. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED exclusion of bidders, theoretical, partially analogue indicator, bid manipulation, bid null 26 Flawed bid opening AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, personal monitoring This indicator indicates risk if bids are not opened in public AND/OR pages are missing from one or more bids AND/OR changes to the bid prices and bid security list are handwritten AND/OR members of the bide evaluation committee [BEC] are present or participating AND/OR The attendance sheet lacks original signatures of the company representatives supposedly present at the ceremony World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, partially analogue indicator, bid manipulation, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator, bid null 27 Manipulated Bid Evaluation Committee [BEC] AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, bid evaluation report [BER], personal monitoring, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if members of the BEC do not have the necessary technical expertise to evaluate the submitted bids AND/OR the project uses a standing BEC regardless of what is being procured AND/OR the committee is too large or dominated by a single individual World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, partially analogue indicator, procedural indicator null 28 Different evaluation criteria AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, bid evaluation report [BER] This redflag indicates risk if the evaluation criteria differ from those issued in the bidding documents AND/OR improper or arbitrary evaluation sub-criteria or procedures are developed at the time of evaluation that differ from the issued bidding documents AND/OR there are changes in the scoring of bids or arbitrary scoring of bids World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, biased evaluation null 29 Lack of prequalification AUTONOMOUS INT bid evaluation report [BER], bidding documents, published notices This redflag indicates risk if the winning bidder is not on the short list or is not one of the prequalified companies World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, eligibility criteria, process rigging, biased evaluation null 30 Complaints about the evaluation process AUTONOMOUS INT complaints This redflag indicates risk if there are any complaints from the bidders about the evaluation process World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED award, theoretical, process rigging, procedural indicator, biased evaluation null 31 Vague justification in evaluation AUTONOMOUS INT bid evaluation report [BER], tender documents This redflag indicates risk if recommendations and disqualifications are poorly justified by the BEC World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED award, theoretical, process rigging null 32 BEC members being under pressure AUTONOMOUS INT human monitoring This redflag indicates risk if there is a pressure exrcised by project officials on BEC members to select a certain contractor World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, analogue indicator null 33 Winning bid is poorly substantiated AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, bid evaluation report [BER], published notices, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if technical specifications are copied from the bidding documents or are incomplete AND/OR the manufacturer?s authorization is missing, outdated or inadequate AND/OR The bid does not match procurement requirements (e.g., in terms of quantity, quality, qualifications) AND/OR Pages of a bid are missing or not signed (when required) World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, bid, biased evaluation null 34 Business similarities AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents This indicator indicates risk if there is a suspicious bid pattern between bidders, like same or similar telephone or facsimile numbers or address shared by bidders World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, bid null 35 Unreasonably high bid prices by losing bidders AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents This redflag indicates risk if there is a suspicious bid pattern that consists of unreasonably high bid prices submitted by losing bidders for which there is no legitimate explanation and which cannot be attributed to an error. The World Bank does not indicate accurate ratio for suspiciously high amount. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, price, bid, statistics null 36 Long delay in contract award or negotiations AUTONOMOUS INT tender documents, published notices This redflag indicates risk if there is a long delay in contract award or negotiations. The World Bank' Handbook does not imply exact numbers. World Bank EN AWARD http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED award, theoretical, temporal indicator, process rigging, leaking confidential information null 37 Deviations from the bidding documents and bids AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, draft contract, delivery documents This redflag indicates risk if there are any changes to quality, quantity or specification both to goods and services in the contract deviating from the bidding document AND/OR changes to contract type AND/OR Changes to standard contract clauses (audit, remedies, damages, etc.)AND/OR price schedules are not the same as the winning bid World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED quantity, theoretical, process rigging, price, dubious contract management, bid null 38 Missing attachments AUTONOMOUS INT draft contract This redflag indicates risk if methodology and work Plan is not attached to the contract AND/OR appendix lacks information about services and facilities provided by the client World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, dubious contract management null 39 Discrepancies in delivery AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, human monitoring, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if there are discrepancies between inspection findings, test results, or contract specifications and the contractor?s claims for payment (incl. false statements, missing supporting docs) AND/OR statements contradict results of background or due diligence checks World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, fraud null 40 De facto failure in delivery AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, tender documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if tests or inspections fail [including the case when the contractor resists Bank or government inspection of its books and records in disregard of the Bank?s and the government?s audit rights] AND/OR there are increased or accelerated product failures or repair costs during the delivery phase of the contract World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, dubious contract management, fraud null 41 Complaints about poor quality AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, complaints This indicator indicates risk if there are any complaints about poor quality from users World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, dubious contract management, fraud null 42 Delay in delivery AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, published notices, tender documents This redflag indicates risk if there is a delayed start of works or a delivery of services beyond normal timeframes AND/OR Long delays in implementation of the contract. The World Bank's Handbook does not indicate figures for normal timeframe. World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, temporal indicator null 43 Poor reputation if the delivering firm AUTONOMOUS INT human monitoring, external databases This redflag indicates risk if a company is known to be a poor performer AND/OR the company has exaggerated or falsified its prior experience World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, fraud, reputation, statistics null 44 False invoices AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if there is no report for invoiced goods or services AND/OR invoiced goods or services cannot be located in the inventory or otherwise accounted for AND/OR no purchase order exists for the invoiced goods or services World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, false claims and invoices null 45 Duplicated or inflated invoices AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, expert knowledge, tender doduments, published notices This redflag indicates risk if the total amount paid to the contractor exceeds invoiced amount AND/OR invoice prices, amounts, item descriptions or terms exceed or do not match (contract terms, receiving or inventory records, supporting documents) AND/OR multiple payments occured in the same time period for the same or similar amount to the same or related vendors, for the same invoice, for the same goods, works, or services AND/OR multiple invoices were submitted with the same description of goods or services, amount and vendor, invoice number and date, purchase order number. World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, false claims and invoices, statistics null 46 Formal changes related to the contractor firm AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, company register This redflag indicates risk if there is a change in the name and legal status of the firm World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, fraud, abuse of contract changes and amendments null 47 Dubious chages affecting only a specific contractor AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents This redflag indicates risk if there are numerous or questionable change orders for a specific contractor that are approved by the same project official World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, abuse of contract changes and amendments, procedural indicator, statistics null 48 Number of changes AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if there is a pattern of change orders just below the treshold for prior review World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, abuse of contract changes and amendments, procedural indicator, statistics null 49 Substantial changes to the output AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, tender documents, expert knowledge, published notices This redflag indicates risk if there are changes in technical specifications AND/OR substantial changes in the terms of reference [TOR] AND/OR Changes to the original design and bill of quantities [BOQ] AND/OR reductions in the quantity of items to be delivered without a commensurate reduction in disbursements AND/OR substitution of materials and equipment World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED quantity, theoretical, process rigging, subject, abuse of contract changes and amendments null 50 Icrease in contract value AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, published notices This redflag indicates risk the increase in contract value (e.g., unit costs) World Bank EN IMPLEMENTATION http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, process rigging, price, abuse of contract changes and amendments null 51 Bid prices are unusall high AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if the winning bid price is much higher than cost estimates or industry averages AND/OR bid prices drop when a new or infrequent bidder enters the bidding process AND/OR persistently high or increasingly high bid prices by all bidders World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, price, bid, statistics null 52 Bidders lose on purpose AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if a company withdraws its bid often without explanation AND/OR submits incomplete bids too frequently AND/OR submits a fraudulent bid security (indicating that it knows it is not going to win) AND/OR company submits unusually high bid prices (especially if prices are rounded or unnatural numbers occur) World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, bid, statistics null 53 Unusual simiarities of bids AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if bid prices of all bidding companies are very close for items where some variation is expected (e.g., civil works, customized goods, and consulting services) AND/OR submitted bids include unit prices which are almost identical AND/OR the bid prices are a fixed percentage apart (e.g., 3 percent, 4 percent, 5 percent and 6 percent above that of the lowest bidder) AND/OR sequential bid securities, indicating that the same person picked up the securities at the same bank, same branch, and on the same day AND/OR bids have commn formal attributes World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, price, bid null 54 Bidders take turns winning AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documents, expert knowledge, external database This redflag indicates risk if there are only a few companies in the market that always bid together and they take turns winning World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, reputation, statistics null 55 Bidders have close ties to each other AUTONOMOUS INT delivery documents, company register, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if a successful bidder subcontracts work to losing bidder(s), which may include those that withdraw their bids AND/OR cross-ownership of bidding companies or family ties (similar names of key staff and owners or family members own the bidding companies) World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, reputation, statistics null 56 Lack of bidders AUTONOMOUS INT tender dosumentation, bidding documentation, external data, human monitoring This redflag indicates risk if (more than half of the) companies that buy the bidding documents refrain from submitting bids AND/OR substantially fewer bids have been received than in previous, similar tender AND/OR well-known qualified companies do not bid, especially if they purchased the bidding documents World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, collusive bidding, output indicator, bid null 57 False or forged audit reports AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documentation, company register, delivery documents This indicator indicates risk if audit reports are not signed or attested AND/OR the audit company does not exist AND/OR the audit report is not in line with auditing standards World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, flaws related to financial capacity null 58 False or exaggerated financial data AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documentation, expert knowledge, external database This indicator indicates risk if the reported financial information contradicts that provided under prior contracts World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, flaws related to financial capacity, statistics null 59 False or exaggerated experience AUTONOMOUS INT bidding documentation, external data This redflag indicates risk if there are discrepancies between self-reported information and other information on the company?s website World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, statistics, flaws related to technical capacity null 60 Forged certificates AUTONOMOUS INT human monitoring, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if certificates are not signed or dated AND/OR certificates appear to be copies rather than originals AND/OR multiple certificates on different dates, from varying sources, appearing to have identical signatures, formatting, etc. World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, fraud, analogue indicator, flaws related to technical capacity null 61 Forged bid securities AUTONOMOUS INT human monitoring, expert knowledge This redflag indicates risk if securities do not have a serial number AND/OR securities are copies rather than originals AND/OR securities are not on original letterhead of the issuing bank and lack the required signatures World Bank EN BIDDING http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption non existent NOT_DEVELOPED theoretical, fraud, analogue indicator, bid security null 62 single bidder EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This numeric redflag-component is part of an index (CRI) that indicates risk risk of grand corruption. Developers rely on the scheme that in order to award the contract to a "specific" bidder, the procuring entity may alter circumstances (specifications) to have a single bidder during the bidding process. Therefore the value is set to 1, if 1 bid received, and 0 if more than 1 bid received during the bidding. Input indicators of the model, correlate with this output. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU MULTIPLE_PHASES http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE output indicator, binary indicator, bid, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 63 exclusion of all but one bid EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This numeric redflag-component is part of an index (CRI) that indicates risk risk of grand corruption. Developers rely on the scheme that in order to award the contract to a "specific" bidder, the procuring entity - if it could not deter all but one bidder from submissing bids - excludes the bids of all unwanted bidders on administrative or formal grounds or unfairly assesses the bids to favour a particular bidder. Therefore the value is set to 1, if 1 bid was NOT excluded, and 0, if more than 1 bid NOT excluded. Input indicators of the model, correlate with this output. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU MULTIPLE_PHASES http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE output indicator, binary indicator, bid, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 64 winner?s share of issuer?s contracts EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This numeric redflag-component is part of an index (CRI) that indicates risk of grand corruption. This redflag is a ratio between 12-month total contract value of winner / 12-month total awarded contract value (by issuer); which is an outcome indicator measuring the public procurement corruption process as a whole. Winner?s share of issuer?s contracts indicates the likelihood of large-scale institutionalized corruption. Input indicators of the model, correlate with this output. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU AWARD http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE numeric indicator, output indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 65 single bidder EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Single received bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly award contracts to the same well-connected company. The indicator's value is set 0 if more than one bid received and 1, if one bid received Corruption Research Center Budapest HU BIDDING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, collusive bidding, input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, binary indicator, bid, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 66 call for tender not published in official journal EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal increases the probability of single received and valid bids and the winner?s contract share in every regression. Therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if the call for tender was published in official journal and 1, if no call for tender was published in official journal Corruption Research Center Budapest HU PLANNING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, restricted information, binary indicator, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 67 procedure type EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Every non-open procedure type carries a higher corruption risk than open procedures in terms of single received and valid bids and winner?s contract share. Therefore developers set the indicator's value 0 , if there is ano open procedure, 1, if there is an invitation procedure, 2, if there is a negotiation procedure, and 3, if there are other procedures (e.g. competitive dialogue). Indicator's value is 4, if procedure type is missing/erroneous. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU PLANNING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, restricted information, leaking confidential information, procedural indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 68 length of eligibility criteria EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This indicator counts number of characters of the eligibility criteria MINUS average number of characters of the given market's eligibility criteria. It indicates risk if eligibility criteria less visible deters bidders [ie. this indicator implies correlation between "overspecification" and tailored tenders - e.g. according to the statistics criteria length above market average by 520-2639 characters 16 increases probability of a single received bid by 10.4%-11.9% and the winner?s share within issuer?s contracts by 1.3% compared to the shortest criteria-length group] Corruption Research Center Budapest HU BIDDING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, eligibility criteria, input indicator, numeric indicator, weighted indicator, algorithmic, rigged specifications, statistics VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 69 Length of submission period EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. A short submission period leaves less time hence make it harder for non-connected companies to bid successfully whereas a well-connected firm can use its inside knowledge to win repeatedly. This indicator counts number of days between publication of call for tenders and submission deadline. CRCB does not provide further clarification on the algorithm. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU BIDDING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE temporal indicator, input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, weighted indicator, restricted information, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 70 relative price of tender documentation EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Relatively expensive tender documentation makes bidding more expensive and hence deters bidders from bidding except for the wellconnected company which is close to certain of its succes. This is a ratio-indicator calculated between the price of tender documentation/contract value. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU BIDDING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, weighted indicator, price, restricted information, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 71 call for tenders modification EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Modifying call for tenders allows for excluding unwanted bidders by changing eligibility criteria once the interested bidders are known. Therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if call for tenders are NOT modified and 1, if call for tenders are modified. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU BIDDING http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, binary indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic, rigged specifications VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 72 exclusion of all but one bid EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Single valid bid contracts make it easier for procuring entities to repeatedly award contracts to the same well-connected company, therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if at least two bids were not excluded and 1, if all but one bid excluded. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU AWARD http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, input indicator, weighted indicator, binary indicator, bid, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 73 weight of non-price evaluation criteria EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This indicator measures the proportion of non-price related evaluation criteria within all criteria, since non-price related evaluation criteria tend to be more subjective, allowing issuers to favour the well-connected company. Apparently unfair assessment criteria also deters bidders. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU AWARD http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, weighted indicator, biased evaluation, algorithmic, statistics VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 74 annulled procedure re-launched subsequently EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. This indicator is contradictory to the prescriptions of the EU Public Procurement Directive or the Hungarian Public Procurement Law, but according to the authors is in line with a corrupt rent extraction logic, since contract awards are annulled and relaunched more often when there were multiple bidders .The indicator's value is set 0, if the contract was awarded in a non-annulled procedure and 1, if the contract was awarded in a procedure annulled, but relaunched. Both annulations by the procuring entities or courts are taken into consideration. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU MULTIPLE_PHASES http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, weighted indicator, binary indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 75 length of decision period EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. Exceptionally short decision periods may indicate rushed through decisions and the corresponding high corruption risks. Exceptionally long decision periods, however may signal multiple legal challenges and troubled decision making hence high corruption risk. The indicator takes into comsideration the number of working days between submission deadline and announcing contract award. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU AWARD http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE temporal indicator, input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, weighted indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 76 contract modification EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. According to the developers of CRI, contract modification(s) suggests that the procuring entity corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. Therefore the indicator's values is set 0 if the contract was not modified during delivery and 1, if the contract was modified during delivery. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU IMPLEMENTATION http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, abuse of contract changes and amendments, binary indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 77 contract lengthening EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. According to the developers of CRI, contract lengthening suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. This indicator contains a relative figure that shows relative contract extension (days of extension/days of contract length). Corruption Research Center Budapest HU IMPLEMENTATION http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE temporal indicator, input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, abuse of contract changes and amendments, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 78 contract value increase EL_OF_COMPOSITE HU CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices. According to the developers of CRI, contract value increase suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. This indicator also contains a relative figure that shows relative contract price increase (change in contract value/original, contracted contract value). CRCB provides no further clarifications on the indicator, besides statistical data on validation. Corruption Research Center Budapest HU IMPLEMENTATION http://tendertracking.eu/about N/A ACTIVE input indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, price, abuse of contract changes and amendments, algorithmic VALIDATED the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows: 1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI 2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level 3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI 4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI 5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change. 79 (Partially) unsuccessful procedure - dubious grounds AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This indicator tells if the procedure was unsuccessful and the procuring entity reasons with grounds (defined by law) qualified as risks (these are the following risk types: only invalid bids (requests to participate) have been submitted OR the procuring entity itself has become unable to conclude a contract OR the procuring entity has decided to declare the procedure invalid because a bidder (competitor) committed an act that harmed the fairness of the competition or the interest of other bidders). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, process rigging, bid manipulation, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 80 (Partially) unsuccessful procedure - without any grounds AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This redflag tells from the wording of the the award notice if it does not indicate the reason for its invalidness, even though the procedure has remained without results (there has been no winning bidder in at least one of the lots of the procurement). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, process rigging, bid manipulation, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 81 Accelerated procedure AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells from the wording of the procurement call if the procuring entity applies accelerated procedure (moreover, it implies a significant risk if there are no grounds mentioned for its use). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, process rigging, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 82 procuring entity - database of K-Monitor AUTONOMOUS HU K-Monitor database http://www.k-monitor.hu/adatbazis is a corruption and public fund watchdog database with several thousand press articles sytematically scanned and tagged. This indicator flags the procedure if the procuring entity is listed in the online media database of K-Monitor. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, reputation, algorithmic null 83 Contract-term implies risks AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This numeric redflag tells from the wording of the procurement call if the procuring entity wants to conclude a contract for an indefinite period or for longer than 4 years. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU PLANNING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE process rigging, numeric indicator, algorithmic null 84 Deadline for bids differs from date of opening AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This indicator tells from the wording of the procurement call if the date of the opening of bids or requests to participate is not the same as the expiry of the deadline to submit bids or requests to participate in procurement procedures. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE temporal indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, bid manipulation, algorithmic null 85 Economic and financial ability - lack of minimum criteria AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the publication of notice holds no prescription of minimum criteria with regard to economic and financial eligibility. This indicator is built upon legal provisions. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, process rigging, restricted information, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 86 Economic and financial ability - requirement on capital AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells from the wording of the procurement call if the publication of notice holds a quantitative or minimum requirement of capital within the scope of economic and financial ability, which is considered risk of corruption K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, rigged specification, algorithmic null 87 EU-funded contract as a reference AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells from the wording of the procurement call if the procuring entity, with regard to technical and professional capacity requires references "financed by EU-funds" (which might be an unduly restriction of competition). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, biased evaluation, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 88 Evaluation of bids with long term AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the actual duration of the evaluation of the bids (i.e. the period between the opening until the the sending of the notice on the results of the procedure) - extension included - exceeds the legal maximum. Hungarian tender notices based on the new legal provisions do not contain the relevant field any more, therefore this indicator was inactivated. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE temporal indicator, numeric indicator, bid manipulation, leaking confidential information, algorithmic null 89 Final contract value - deviation from estimated value AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the final total value of the contract is higher than the estimated value or if the final value is significantly (50%) lower than the estimate. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE process rigging, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic null 90 Framework agreement - high estimated value AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator is only relevant in case of framework agreements and it tells if the estimated value exceeds 1.5 billion [5 million EUR] HUF in case of works or 1 billion HUF [3.3 million EUR] in case of acquisition of goods and services. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU null Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE process rigging, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic null 91 Framework agreement with a single bidder AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator is only relevant in case of procurement procedures for framework agreements and it tells if the procuring entity intends to conclude framework agreements with only one bidder. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, process rigging, procedural indicator, algorithmic, unjustified sole sourcing null 92 Framework agreement with several bidders - number of participants is too low AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator is only relevant in case of procurement procedures for framework agreements and it tells if the procuring entity intends to conclude framework agreements with fewer bidders than the legal minimum (3). This indicator is built upon legal provisions. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, collusive bidding, process rigging, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 93 High estimated value AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The numeric indicator scans procurement calls and tells if the estimated value of the procurement exceeds 1.5 billion HUF [5 million EUR] in case of works or 1 billion HUF [3.3 million EUR] in case of acquisition of goods and services. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE process rigging, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic null 94 High final value AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The numeric indicator scans award notices and tells if the estimated value is not available and the actual final value of the procurement exceeds 1.5 billion HUF [5 million EUR] in case of works or 1 billion HUF [3.3 million EUR] in case of acquisition of goods and services. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE process rigging, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic null 95 Inappropriate grounds for exclusion AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This redflag tells if the legally required indication of the grounds for exclusion (or the indication thereof) is missing from the wording of the procurement call. The algorithm looks for references of the relevant Hungarian legal provisions. Absence of these references flags the procedure. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, process rigging, algorithmic null 96 Lack of evaluation method AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity does not indicate the evaluation method of bids among the the evaluation criteria. This indicator is built in accordance with the Hungarian legal provisions and scans procurement calls. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, process rigging, restricted information, bid manipulation, procedural indicator, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 97 Long term framework agreement AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator is only relevant in case of procurement procedures for framework agreements and it tells if the procuring entity intends to conclude framework agreements for a longer period of time than 4 years. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE temporal indicator, process rigging, numeric indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 98 Negotiated procedure without (proper) legal grounds AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the grounds for the use of negotiated procedure (launched by the publication of the procurement notice) are missing or they are wrongly stated. The algorithm looks for meeting legal requirements in several type of procedures. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, process rigging, restricted information, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 99 Number of bids AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This numeric indicator tells a risk from the relevant field of the award notices if the number of bids per procedure (part) is under 3, but also shows if 1 or 2 bids have been submitted. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, collusive bidding, numeric indicator, bid manipulation, bid, algorithmic null 100 Number of competitors - missing restricting criteria AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity did not indicate in the procurement call the method of ranking if setting the range of the number of competitors. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, procedural indicator, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 101 Number of competitors is low AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the number of competitors determined by the procuring entity in certain procedure types is lower than the legal minimum of bidders. This indicator is built upon Hungarian legal provisions and scans procurement calls. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, process rigging, numeric indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 102 Past annual revenue statement required for too many years back AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) This redflag tells if the procuring entity demands past annual revenue statement from the part of the bidders for a longer time than the legal maximum (3 years). It scans the wording of the procurement calls. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 103 Payment deadline as evaluation criterion AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator scans the wording of the procurement calls and if the the principle of the economically most advantegous bid is applied for evaluation criterion, flags procedures where payment deadline (and its duration) - as an evaluation subcriterion - is also applied. This indicator is built upon expert knowledge about corruption risks. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 104 Deviating period of reference requirements AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity - within the scope of technical and professional capacity requirements of the procurement call - extends the past period of the required references unduly, by derogation from the period as defined by law (5-8 years in case of works, 3-6 years in case of acquisition of goods and services). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, biased evaluation, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 105 Procedure without contract notice AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells form the relevant field of the award notice, if the procuring entity has applied or applies a procedure not launched by an open procurement call. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE prodecural indicator, process rigging, binary indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 106 Rate of bid bond/estimated value is too high AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the bid bond required by the procuring entity in the procurement call exceeds a limit (2%) compared to the estimated value of procurement, as demanding a too high bid bond might restrict competition. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 107 Reference requirements exceed estimated value AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity - as part of technical and professional capacity - prescribes the certification of references of a higher total value than 75% of the estimated value of the procurement. This redflag is built upon relevant Hungarian legal provisions. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, numeric indicator, price, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 108 Renewal of the contract implies risks AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the potential number of renewals for a contract can be considered above average (3 ore more) or if that might result in a longer contract (4 or more years). Moreover, it can be of significant risk if there is no imformation available with regard to the possible renewals. This indicator scans wording of the relevant fields of the procurement calls. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE text recognition with regex, process rigging, numeric indicator, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 109 Required length of professional experience is too long AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity, within the scope of technical and professional capacity, requires a professional experience of 8 or more years for the contracted experts. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 110 Required revenue exceeds estimated value of the procurement AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity requires bidders to warrant subject related revenue (as part of economic and financial ability) that exceeds the total estimated value of the procurement. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 111 Requirement of a reference performed within one contract AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity, when setting references, restricts the acceptance of past performances by only accepting references incorporated "within one contract" of a particular value and quantity. This indicator is built upon expert knowledge and scans procurement calls. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 112 Risk of cartel AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU), information needs to be updated from Competition Authority The indicator tells if the subject of the procurement falls into an area carrying increased risk as defined by the Hungarian Competition Authority based on analysis of former agreements restricting competition. This indicator relies both on external data and data of relevant field of the procurement call. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, collusive bidding, subject, algorithmic, statistics null 113 Successful procedure - without entering into contract AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator flags the procedure - by scanning award notices - if the tender process was successful (there is a winning bidder) but the parties have not concluded a contract. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE text recognition with regex, process rigging, procedural indicator, algorithmic null 114 Technical and professional capacity - lack of minimum criteria AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells from the wording of the published procurement call if it holds no prescription of minimum criteria with regard to technical and professional capacity. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, process rigging, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 115 Technical and professional capacity - restricting geographical requirements AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity, with regard to technical and professional capacity, restricts the setting of eligibility criteria unduly by setting geographilcal requirements e.g. equipment, capacity within a distance, availability of an estate etc. This redflag is built upon expert knowledge and scrutiny of dubious Hungarian practical examples. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, eligibility criteria, process rigging, biased evaluation, algorithmic, rigged specifications null 116 Timeframe to submit bids is too tight AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator shows if the expiry of the deadline for the submission of bids/requests to participate is shorter than the legal minimum, in accordance with the EU law (in case of an open proceudre, the expiry of the deadline for the submission of the bids is relevant). K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU BIDDING Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags INACTIVE exclusion of bidders, text recognition with regex, temporal indicator, numeric indicator, bid manipulation, algorithmic null 117 Too few (or no) evaluation criteria AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells if the procuring entity does not define at least 2 evaluation criteria for the evaluation of bids. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU AWARD Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, restricted information, biased evaluation, algorithmic null 118 Uncertain quantity AUTONOMOUS HU published notices in Tender Electronic Daily (Official Journal of the EU) The indicator tells from the wording of the relevant fieled of the procurement call if the procuring entity allows a deviation of 50% or more with regard to the total quantity (to be acquired) or allows a deviation from the total quantity without charging a fee. This redflags indicates unvertainty in the procurement that restricts competition. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE quantity, text recognition with regex, numeric indicator, restricted information, rigged specification, algorithmic null 119 Winner - database of K-Monitor AUTONOMOUS HU K-Monitor database http://www.k-monitor.hu/adatbazis is a corruption and public fund watchdog database with several thousand press articles sytematically scanned and tagged. The indicator flags the procedure if the winning bidder is listed in the online media database of K-Monitor. K-Monitor - Transparency International H - PetaByte HU MULTIPLE_PHASES Java http://www.redflags.eu/ https://github.com/petabyte-research/redflags ACTIVE text recognition with regex, reputation, algorithmic null